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The Three Gorges Project: 
Great Plans and their 
Unforeseen Consequences
James von Geldern
On June 6, 2006, Chinese engineers demolished the last of the cof-
ferdams protecting the primary dam that will turn the Long River 
(called the Yangtze by most Westerners) and its scenic Three Gorges 
region into a massive energy-producing lake. The government chose 
the foreboding date of 6-6-6 for the explosion, and was rewarded when 
the barrier withstood the blast wave without apocalyptic results. Water 
has begun to fill the reservoir, and will eventually climb 175 meters 
up the walls of the gorge. The initial rush of water has been stilled. 
Soon the rapids of the Long River will grow quiet, and the treacher-
ous floods that have killed many peasants over the centuries will be 
controlled.
The Chinese government has approached the construction with 
remarkably thorough planning. Nobody can foresee all the conse-
quences of such an enormous project, but beginning in 1992, com-
missions have investigated the ecological and social impacts in 
unprecedented breadth. The benefits are manifest and many: plentiful 
energy will spark regional and national economic development, navi-
gation of the river will be easier, and the dangerous Long River floods 
will be tamed.
Commissions also looked at potential adverse effects and attempted 
to find solutions. The Long River Valley is home to a rich cultural 
and archeological heritage that will disappear forever under the ris-
ing waters. Delicate ecosystems within the river and along its banks 
could be damaged or wiped out. The river silt, which lays down fertile 
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agricultural soil and provides land for rapidly expanding Shanghai at 
its mouth, is in danger of being cut off. The government has made lav-
ish expenditures to preserve the archaeological treasures of the basin. 
Uninvestigated sites are being rapidly explored by teams of archaeolo-
gists; architectural gems are being dismantled and moved. The twelve-
story wooden pagoda at Shibaozhai will survive on its own island, 
created by a special dam built to preserve its beauty.
If the blast wave from the final coffer has been quelled and the river 
tamed, the dam has sent another wave across the whole of China, a 
wave of more than a million people whose homes will be engulfed by 
the rising waters. The government is still grappling with this problem, 
though not for lack of planning, and it is finding that uprooting the 
people and their venerable cultures is disruptive and unpredictable. 
The traditions of the Long River Valley survived the catastrophes of 
the twentieth century without deep rupture. The fall of the imperial 
dynasty in 1911, the Japanese invasion, the Communist makeover of 
culture and society, and then the Cultural Revolution washed through 
with great but not insurmountable losses. The only force that has 
proven capable of uprooting the valley folk and stripping them of their 
land and customs has been economic development. Having survived 
the twentieth century, tradition will succumb to the early twenty-first.
I. Planning the Deluge
The Long River, called the “wildest, wickedest river on Earth” by Pearl 
Buck, has long brought destruction to river basin residents. Hundreds 
of thousands have perished in its periodic floods. Rain feeds the river 
along its northern and southern reaches, and the lush rainy season 
from May to June in the south and July to August in the north extends 
the flood season from May to August. The major floods that periodi-
cally sweep through the valley have been disastrous. The flood of 1911 
killed 100,000, while 145,000 died in 1931, and 142,000 in 1935. Under 
the Communist regime, a flood killed 30,000 people in 1954, while the 
floods of 1998 yielded an official death toll of only 4,000, but still devas-
tated low-lying villages and towns. Few would dispute the benefits of 
a system of dams that will still the river waters and control its floods.
The inundation brought by the Three Gorges Dam will be slower, 
but ultimately it will destroy far more homes and disperse over a mil-
lion people throughout China. The water will rise 175 meters in places, 
corresponding roughly to the 180-meter height of the dam. Much of 
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the flooded land will be in Sichuan Province, called the land of abun-
dance for the crops that grace its terraced mountains and red soil. Sich-
uan is famous around the world for its fiery red peppers and cuisine, 
and in China as the cradle of several unique cultural traditions. Strad-
dling the imaginary border that divides northern from southern China, 
its own borders have been stable for the last 500 years. Its steep slopes 
and plunging gorges make travel by land difficult, but the Long River 
has given the region a convenient transport route and left it open to the 
tides of history.
Generations of peasants have cut the slopes into arable terraces, 
where they grow wheat, oranges, peaches, sugar cane, sweet potatoes, 
and other cash crops. Corn is planted where the slopes are too steep for 
other crops, and valley floors have been leveled over the centuries for 
rice paddies. Between the lower slopes and the corn grow the orange 
trees, whose fragrant blooms have given Sichuan peasants a reliable 
and valuable crop, and a unique set of cultural traditions as well. Peas-
ants usually put their squat homes on the lower reaches of the moun-
tains, where water is abundant and the river accessible for fishing and 
other uses.
The mountainous riverbanks from Chongqinq to the dam site near 
Yichang are marked by white signs with the red number 175, showing 
the level to which the water will eventually rise. The signs run along 
the river valley like a baste stitch, preparing residents for the day when 
their old lives will be washed away. They have become accustomed 
to the the possibility of floods, but none so catastrophic as this, which 
will remove their homes, their traditions, and the centuries of work 
that their ancestors performed to make the land a rich agricultural 
base. On many hills the stitch cuts about halfway up the slope, right 
through the belt of orange trees. In its original plan, the central govern-
ment provided land higher up the slopes for valley peasants. The law 
of unforeseen consequences has swept that plan aside, just as the Long 
River waters are sweeping aside villages and towns. Orange cultiva-
tion cannot simply be moved higher up the steep banks. The peasants 
who long ago chose the middle belt of the slopes for the oranges based 
their choice on years of experience. The oranges do not grow at high 
elevations or too close to the river, and they cannot take permanent 
root on the steep upper slopes. Only the corn grows on the upper 
reaches, and the peasants plant it on every square foot of the valu-
able land. Corn grows to within a foot of the highway in places and 
is planted in clay-red cuts in the rock and along plunging footpaths. 
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Orange trees cannot be planted on such land, and local orange cultures 
are fated to disappear.
Land on the upper slopes of the Long River Valley also proved 
highly unstable and prone to erosion. Six years into the dam project 
and the resettlement program the government, under the leadership of 
new Premier Zhu Rongji, was forced to issue new regulations to curb 
dangerous soil erosion. The regulations forbade farming on slopes 
steeper than 20 degrees, and mandated that this land be reforested. 
River Valley peasants could not simply be moved up the hills, nor 
could they be moved into the heavily farmed districts inland. They 
would have to be moved to other provinces, where they would be 
resettled, with cash awards provided by the central government and 
paid out by local governments.
This policy shift, unavoidable for environmental reasons but unfore-
seen in the original planning process, has had the most calamitous 
consequences for peasant resettlers. The unpleasant prospect of mov-
ing higher up the riverbanks entailed cutting new terraces, tilling new 
land, building new homes. But the resettlers would have remained in 
their homelands, the source of their individual and family identities. 
They would have remained within Sichuan and its traditions. Their 
dialect would be the local dialect, their skills would match the fields 
and soils around them. The deep grievances voiced by the people we 
found arise from being uprooted, from living among people they do 
not know and whose dialect they might not speak, from relying on 
local officials who are not responsible to them, and from finding their 
long-nurtured skills useless on their new land.
II. The Dispossessed Peasants
One of the ironies of the project is that Zhu, who devoted his steward-
ship as Premier to strengthening agriculture and improving the lives 
of rural residents, was forced into the decision that would disperse 
Sichuan peasants to distant lands. His economic leadership stabilized 
China during the years of the Asian financial crisis, and provided it 
with the financial resources that are speeding the conversion of farm-
land to industrial use today. There is an unmistakable trend to convert 
farmland to industrial and semi-industrial uses, and the process is 
most rapid in regions where the agricultural land is richest. Farmers 
who have the opportunity to hold on to good land often do not want 
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to, while the people who are doomed to lose their land, no matter how 
difficult it is to farm, cling to it desperately.
The countryside surrounding the city of Wuxi (near Nanjing), long 
among the most fertile lands in China, is swiftly disappearing under 
a forest of small machine shops, textile factories, and opulent govern-
ment buildings. The wealth of the region, originally founded on its agri-
culture, has allowed it to leap into the boom of capitalism aggressively. 
Land has become more valuable for its potential business applications, 
and peasants gladly sell out their rights for generous compensation. 
Central government taxation policies designed to foster the agricul-
tural sector actually encourage local governments to convert farmland 
to economic purposes. No taxes can be levied on farmland while land 
used for business yields a healthy 40 percent taxation rate. Local gov-
ernments can charge eager entrepeneurs hefty rents. Officials in their 
opulent offices have every inducement to seize farmland and pay gen-
erous prices to the residents. The conversion has been so rapid that the 
Wuxi government has found it necessary to preserve a model village 
as a remnant of the disappearing life. A visit to the village reveals an 
old-fashioned barbershop, ancient pool halls, traditional homes with 
age-weathered timber ceilings—but little farming. The one farm still 
to be found is being converted into a highly profitable pleasure park, 
complete with a pavilion for musical performances, a pond, and a zoo 
for exotic animals like ostriches and crocodiles. The proud owner and 
happy city official who gave a tour of the grounds was confident of the 
bountiful rents and profits that would come of the project.
Long River Valley peasants are not happy to be dispossessed of 
their land. Their financial settlements were determined by the plan-
ning commission in 1992. This example of “foresight” has left the Long 
River peasants with settlements determined before the value of land 
shot up, and they are now unable to pay the higher contemporary 
prices in their new places of settlement. Officials in their home districts 
have no incentive to raise their settlement packages to reflect current 
values; and even if they did, the value of the land is depressed. Offi-
cials in their new homes have little incentive to offer resettlers land at 
prices commensurate with the compensation they received.
The resettlers are subject to a deep cultural alienation as well. They 
miss the long traditions that seeped into the soil of their Sichuan homes, 
the hard work of their forbearers that made the steep hills arable. They 
have heard the stories of neighbors who accepted resettlement and 
later returned to their homes illegally because of the lack of economic 
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opportunities in their new homes, the hostility of their new neighbors 
and local officials, and the sense of longing for their homeland. Reset-
tlers to different counties in Sichuan Province, or worse, to entirely 
new provinces, are faceless to their neighbors and local governments. 
They are surrounded by people who would prefer to forget they are 
there, and who envy them for the large cash settlements and rich land 
allotments they received.
III. Finding the Resettled
Finding the resettlers is extraordinarily difficult, despite the fact that 
there is a central Three Gorges Resettlement Office with local offices 
in the larger cities of Sichuan. Government officials will not speak of 
them or provide names or resettlement sites. They question outsiders 
who come to investigate the resettlement, as if there can be no accept-
able motive for visiting the migrants. Many local officials have been 
accused or even convicted of embezzling resettlement funds provided 
by the central government. The central government has executed sev-
eral officials who were caught, and their cases were publicized in 
central press organs. Hence, suspicion of outside investigators is not 
surprising. Outsiders, Chinese or foreign, who persist in their investi-
gations are often arrested under a variety of pretexts and warned not 
to return. The officials are unhindered by the fact that no law forbids 
visiting the migrants, and they seem happy to invent or creatively 
interpret laws to cover their actions.
Local residents are more forthcoming with information about reset-
tlers. Many will tell an outsider where to look, but their directions are 
often vague or simply incorrect. In Chongqing we were told to drive 
north to the town of Hechuan. On arrival our search for the migrants 
was fruitless, until our driver remembered an old friend who might 
help. The friend in fact was glad to take us to the migrant settlements, 
but on arrival we found them unfinished and empty. We were assured 
that the new settlers would be arriving in “two weeks,” although it 
was unclear how they would live in the spacious but unfinished row 
houses, where building was ongoing but sporadic. Our host assured us 
that Hechuan residents would be delighted to greet the migrants, since 
the town was deriving great economic benefit from them. In the two 
separate settlements that we visited, we were told that the migrants 
had been brought to Hechuan and allowed to select any parcel of land 
they wished. The government would buy it for them from the locals. 
Macalester International  Vol. 18
306
Our smiling host told us that they were only too willing to sell the land, 
because agriculture was no longer economically worthwhile in the new 
economy. He did not explain why the lands to be given to the resettlers 
in two weeks were under intense cultivation at the moment, or how 
the resettlers would be able to pay off the mortgages on their spacious 
homes through unprofitable farming. Our travels would teach us that 
there are many questions that must not be asked.
Our host in Hechuan was something of a local celebrity. He had a 
son who had died in the army’s battle against the flood of 1998 and 
was rewarded richly by the government for his loss. He had deep 
reasons to applaud a project that would tame the Long River floods, 
and a loyalty to the government that he proved in his tour. His assur-
ances that local residents would greet resettlers with open arms were 
not confirmed in other places. Sichuan peasants who moved in small 
clusters to other regions of China have complained bitterly of their 
reception and their alienation from the local culture. In the Changle 
District of Fujian Province (incorporated into the major city of Fuzhou) 
on the southern coast of China, Sichuan resettlers were disaffected and 
frustrated by their new environment. They did not speak the local dia-
lect, despite the language classes that the government provided, and 
could not communicate with many of their neighbors. These neighbors 
were resentful of the fine townhouses in which they lived. In fact, their 
homes were spacious but poorly constructed, much as the homes we 
saw in Hechuan had been. The neighbors were unaware that they 
carried large mortgages for these homes, debts that they would not 
be able to repay through agricultural work. The soil of Fujian is poor, 
mixed with sand and clay and difficult to cultivate. The resettlers were 
struggling to make a living, struggling to repay their debts, struggling 
to find a home in this foreign land. They received little sympathy from 
their neighbors, most of whom could not even tell us where they lived. 
From our driver, a Fuzhou resident who did not hesitate to the criticize 
the government when he wished, they received no sympathy. Fujian 
natives have been leaving their homes for centuries to migrate across 
the world. They continue to do so, as the rows of empty houses that we 
saw in Fuzhou and Changle would confirm. Faced with the complaints 
of the resettled migrants, the driver could only respond heatedly that 
everybody had it just as bad.
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IV. Resettling the Cities
City and townspeople can be resettled with slightly less turmoil than 
peasants. Cities in the valley are pitched along the steep riverbanks. 
Riverboat passengers arrive and look straight up to the top of a city 
whose roadways wind gradually upward to accommodate small-
engined cars and trucks. Lined with small shops and peasants selling 
produce, the streets are intersected by plunging concrete stairways, 
which pedestrians can descend from city top to port. Although many 
of the mountains that loom over the river are thousands of feet high, 
access to the markets (and the world) occurs along the river, and much 
of the population lives below the 175-meter mark. For them, there is no 
choice but to resettle.
Resettled city residents often simply move higher up the riverbanks 
in the same city to newly built flats. Although their accommodations 
are spacious by Chinese standards, many still complain bitterly of 
the changes, and many of their complaints echo those of the peasants. 
Wanzhou, on the upper reaches of the Three Gorges, and Fengdu, a 
low-lying city about a hundred miles west of Wanzhou, offer a case in 
point about the unforeseeable consequences of planned resettlement. 
Fengdu is located outside the gorge region and is situated on relatively 
flat land on the southern bank of the river. The city will be totally 
submerged by the river waters, and its cultural and historical monu-
ments will become ghosts. Only the famous Ghost City, a temple com-
plex that has become a tourist attraction complete with a theme park, 
will remain. Its location on the elevation of Mingshan will become an 
island, which tourists will visit by boat.
Ambitious planners decided to build an entirely new city, New 
Fengdu, across the river from Fengdu on higher ground. The city fea-
tures broad avenues thronged with automobiles, neon lights cutting 
into the night sky, and neighborhoods of apartment buildings with 
spacious flats. When officials claim that they are providing resettlers 
with better lives than before, they can point to the modern amenities 
of New Fengdu as solid proof. Stores supply the many needs of the 
residents, and services of all sorts are available in the shops that line 
the streets. New Fengdu would seem to be a model of modern urban 
planning.
Migrants are not hard to find in New Fengdu, and they do not 
hesitate to share their experiences with outsiders. Here, as in Fujian 
Province, when conversations turn to the subject of the resettlement, 
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normally calm voices rise in pitch and fill with fury, and everyone 
looks over their shoulders for the inevitable police presence. Conversa-
tions do not go longer than thirty minutes, beyond which the risk of 
an informer becomes too great. Still people talk, the older more freely 
than the young, since they have less to lose. Neighborhood residents 
gather on the open first floor of a new home, which the state has pro-
vided as space for business. They complain that economic conditions 
make running a store very difficult. Although the courtyard sports a 
bustling peasant market, the small grocery store has few customers. 
New Fengdu is a city of people in debt for their new homes, and the 
jobs promised to resettlers have failed to materialize. Few customers 
can afford the city-produced products in the store or the mark-up 
required for a decent profit. The people filling the store were idling 
their time away without work. The women sat in the front of the shop 
and embroidered. The men sat in the back smoking and playing mah 
jong. Their idleness confirmed what they told us about the difficulty of 
making a living in their new home.
V. The Means of Redress
An old man entered the store. When he heard the subject of the con-
versation, he erupted in a torrent of fury. He told us, as so many oth-
ers had, about the settlement he had received on his old home and 
the need to buy his new home at present-day prices. The inflation of 
prices that had occurred during the decade of rapid growth had left 
him indebted, with no way to recover the difference. His plight was 
exacerbated by the large share of the resettlement that officials with-
held. The old man showed us the petition that he was trying to submit 
to the central government. Petitions are an anachronism preserved in 
the present legal system that allow citizens to present their grievances 
directly to the central government. In a system where the judiciary is 
not trusted by citizens, where property rights have only recently been 
recognized in the socialist constitution, and where title registration 
has been neglected for decades, the petition is the preferred means of 
redress for aggrieved resettlers. Petitions are also a source of fear for 
local officials, in that they allow local residents to report the officials’ 
actions to central authorities. Thus local officials seek to prevent peti-
tioners from travelling to government centers to present their petitions. 
Despite the efforts of local officials and despite the rumors that only 
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one of a hundred petitions finds justice, petitioners beseige provincial 
capitals and even Beijing.
The small town of Xintian, outside of Wanzhou, offers a vivid illus-
tration of the dislocations and unanticipated grievances that arise from 
the resettlement project. Xintian clings to steep hills rising up from the 
Long River, and looks up to towering bluffs. A 175-meter sign greets 
visitors along its single dirt entry road, which crosses a bridge span-
ning the gorge along which the town is perched. Descending the road 
into the town, one cannot be unaware that the old homes will soon be 
inundated. The homes of the town are being dismantled brick by brick, 
beam by beam, to leave the future inlet navigable. A new settlement of 
fine townhomes, with first floor business space, had been built along 
a single road atop the bluff, far above the future river waters. On the 
day of our June 3, 2006 visit, residents showed us eviction notices for 
June 6. The homes below them had already been dismantled and now 
it was their turn. Despite the impossibility of remaining, of staving off 
the power of the government and the waters of the Long River, many 
residents were determined to stay and defend their homes until they 
received the compensation they deserved.
The reasons they offered for their resistance were many, yet none 
were foreseen in the original planning process. Xintian had fallen vic-
tim to the flood of 1998, when loss of life was relatively low but prop-
erty losses were great. Many low-lying homes were destroyed when 
floodwaters reached the town, and families had been forced to rebuild 
their homes with little state assistance. Many of the nicest homes in 
town were those restored after the flood. Property values, however, 
had been fixed in 1992 and did not reflect the improved values of the 
homes. People living in fine Xintian homes were faced with compensa-
tion far below the value, and had little ability to pay for the new homes 
being offered atop the bluff or elsewhere in China. An older man who 
had already abandoned his home was still waiting for compensation, 
and was forced in the meantime to live with his daughter and son-in-
law in Wanzhou. When he had bought the property many years ago, 
which included an apartment and spaces for business, he had regis-
tered the deed in his wife’s name. Under the property laws of socialist 
China, the deed meant little in the face of his actual possession of the 
home, even after his wife left him and moved away. The Three Gorges 
Resettlement Bureau compensates only when there is legal possession 
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of a property, leaving this old man without payment for his loss and no 
way to buy a new home.
Saddest was the fate of an old man living in a home where dis-
mantling had begun. The old home with its weathered timbers and 
smoothed stone floors was a relic of another age. It was built by his 
grandfather and reflected the needs of that simpler time: glassless win-
dows, oil lamps, a coal-fired wok—with the back of the house reserved 
for the family pig, who still lived there in his sty. In a modern China 
rushing towards a market economy, this structure could have little 
compensation value. Yet the old man was determined to stay, although 
the bricks of the surrounding walls were being hauled away, although 
the river waters would arrive, although the government would remove 
him forcibly. He, like the Sichuan peasants dispersed from the river 
valley across the whole of China, was tied to this place built by his 
grandfather against the face of the Long River bluffs. He felt the cut-
ting of this long thread of tradition most deeply.
VI. Modern Planning in a Traditional Country
The Three Gorges Dam project has taken place at a time of great 
upheaval in rural and urban life. Economic forces have made agricul-
ture a meager livelihood in comparison to the opportunities in private 
and public industry. There has been a massive migration of labor from 
the countryside to cities. Local and central government officials, aware 
of the taxes that can be reaped by conversion of agricultural land to 
industrial purposes, and in some cases, of the individual fortunes to 
be made by the illegal sale of land rights, have used and abused their 
powers to dispossess peasants of their land.
China, where the vast rural population has served as a source of 
cultural stability and has lived on the land for generations, has become 
a country of migrants. The Three Gorges Dam project has made invol-
untary migrants of river valley residents, uprooting them without any 
cultural buffers. Where economic forces have driven peasants from 
their land in other parts of China, the tumultuous process of urban-
ization has been softened by informal buffers. Peasants who move to 
the city preserve ties to their families and homelands, sending money 
home to kin and visiting their homes. The buffers that protect these 
migrants are absent in the lives of the Three Gorges resettlers, whose 
homes have been destroyed and who will soon have nowhere to return. 
The original government plan to move peasants higher up the valley 
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hills, above the rising waters, was upset by the unforeseen erosion. 
Families who thought that their new lives would take place on familiar 
terrain within a familiar culture—and that they could continue their 
traditional agricultural pursuits—find themselves scattered through-
out China, often in alien lands where they have no roots, no familiar 
culture, and no useable economic skills.
The rigorous planning process undertaken by the Chinese govern-
ment, for all its vast reach, did not account for the unforeseen impact of 
erosion, which sent waves of migrants throughout the country. It could 
not plan for cultural displacement in the way that it could provide for 
economic and social displacements. The government could set aside 
funds for transport and new housing, it could optimistically forecast 
that the growing economy would generate jobs for resettlers, it could 
create job training programs and, in extreme cases, provide language 
classes for settlers in distant provinces. It could not provide funds to 
heal alienation and uprootedness.
The planning process was rigorous, but far from perfect. Among the 
many unforeseen circumstances that arose after planning was com-
pleted was the rapid rise in land values and the cost of labor and build-
ing materials that made the compensation set in 1992 inadequate to the 
present needs of the resettlers. They arrived but were unable to pay for 
their new houses, and they were burdened by heavy debts that they 
could not repay. The problem was compounded in many places by the 
corruption of local officials, which deprived them of large shares of 
their compensation packages.
This gap in the planning process has been exacerbated by the 
absence of credible institutional buffers to protect resettlers treated 
unfairly by the government. The civil court system is relatively new in 
China; it came into being at about the same time as the Three Gorges 
planning commission. The civil courts have not established their inde-
pendence from the government nor have they won the trust of citizens. 
Additionally, most citizens do not have the knowledge that would 
allow them to effectively utilize the courts. Resettlers deprived of ade-
quate compensation have instead relied on the more traditional means 
of the petition. When successful, this provides direct access to the 
central government, but it suffers from providing arbitrary justice, and 
can easily be ignored or diverted by officials. The question of whether 
resettlers are being given the adequate compensation mandated by 
Chinese law is decided not by independent courts, but by the govern-
ment officials whose own budgets would suffer as a consequence.
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Thus the Three Gorges resettlers find themselves caught between 
the forces of modernization and tradition as they move to their new 
homes. The modern planning process that has directed the vast con-
struction project provided for their resettlement, but did not foresee 
the circumstances that would make local resettlement difficult. Resi-
dents must be resettled across the whole of China, and many find 
themselves in communities alien to them, which are unprepared and 
often unwilling to receive them. The compensation that the govern-
ment provided to establish new homes has proved inadequate, and 
there are no institutions that the resettlers can turn to for fair com-
pensation. In a country that was already undergoing great economic, 
social, and cultural upheaval, they find themselves stranded by unfore-
seen circumstances. •
